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Abstract — Collusion-secure codes are used in digital ﬁnger-
printing and traitor tracing. Scattering codes were recently in-
troduced by Sebé and Domingo-Ferrer, and used to contstruct a
family of codes allegedly collusion-secure against three pirates.
We prove that their codes are insecure against optimal pirate
strategies, and we present a new secure construction.
Digital ﬁngerprinting [1] and traitor tracing [2] require collusion-
secure codes. Each user is identiﬁed by a unique codeword from an
(n,M) code C, and when he or she buys a copy of a copyrighted
work, this codeword is somehow embedded. Illegal copies can be
traced back to the copyright pirate.
A collusion of pirates can create copies with a hybrid ﬁngerprint.
If they have a set P of ﬁngerprints, they can produce a hybrid from
the feasible set F (P ), deﬁned as
FC (P ) = {(c1, . . . , cn) : ∀i,∃(x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ P,xi = ci}.
If C is (t, )-secure, there is an algorithm A which takes a hybrid
ﬁngerprint x as input and outputs one of the pirate ﬁngerprints with
probability at least 1− , as long as there are at most t pirates.
When the codeword is embedded, a random permutation of the
underlying code is used. Hence, when the pirates detect a column,
they cannot know where it belongs in the codeword. A group of three
pirates can distinguish between three diﬀerent column types, (100),
(010), and (001) and their complements. It is generally assumed that
the pirates chooses a strategy (p1,p2,p3), where pi is the probability
of outputting the majority bit when pirate i is the minority. This is a
safe assumption for long codewords.
The scattering code SC(r, t) [3] is a probabilistic encoding of a sin-
gle bit. The purpose of the scattering code is two reveil the bit seen
by at least two pirates. Supposing p1 = p2 = p3 there is a lower bound
p∗(r, t) on the probability that the majority bit is output. The scatter-
ing codes used in our best constructions have p∗(1,3) = 0.5286.
In the original ﬁngerprinting scheme the scattering code is con-
catenated with a simplex code. This is not secure when we do not
require p1 = p2 = p3. If the pirates choose a pure strategy (p1,p2,p3)
uniformly at random from (1,1,1), (1,0,0), (0,1,0), and (0,0,1),
then all possible three-sets of pirates from a set {a1,a2,a3,a1 +a2 +
a3} give hybrid ﬁngerprints with the same probability distribution.
Consequently, any tracing algorithm fails with probability at least
1/4.
We propose a new scheme, where the simplex codes in [3] are
replaced by outer codes which are both (2,2)- and (3,1)-separating.
The minimum and maximum separating weights are bounded in an
interval [3, ¯3]. It is know that such codes can be constructed from
duals of BCH codes [4]. For this new scheme, it is possible to prove
that there is an optimal pirate strategy with p1 = p2 = p3.
Theorem 1 Let CO be a binary code with (2,2)- and (3,1)-
separating weights in the interval [3, ¯3], where λ = ¯3/3 ≤ 2, and
1The work has been supported by NFR grant no. 146874/420.
concatenate it with SC(r, t). Suppose r is odd and p∗(r, t)≥ 1/2. Then
the concatenated code is 3-secure with -error where
 ≤M · e−a·3 ,
and
a =
(
1+2(2p∗(r, t)−1)ν1,2− (2p∗(r, t)−1)λ
)2
8(2ν1,2p∗(r, t)+ (1−p∗(r, t))λ)) 3,
where
ν1,2 =
p∗(r, t)+ (5p∗(r, t)−2p∗(r, t)2−2)λ
2(2p∗(r, t)2−p∗(r, t)) ,
or if this is outside [1,λ], then ν1,2 is equal to the closest boundary.
Among the best (3, )-secure codes we ﬁnd is a (57330,218) with
 ≤ 10−16 and (458745,240) with  ≤ 10−148. Both use an SC(1,3)
inner code; with BCH⊥(3) with n= 212−1 for the ﬁrst and BCH⊥(5)
with n = 216−1 for the second.
There are two comparable schemes in the literature. The one due
to Boneh and Shaw [1, 5] requires codewords 10 or 20 times as long
as our scheme. Another scheme [6] have approximately the same rate
as our scheme, and will be better for some parameters and worse for
others. Contrary to Boneh-Shaw, neither our scheme or that from [6]
can be easily constructes for arbitrary parameters.
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